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Risk Estimation and Expert Judgment:
The Case of Yucca Mountain
Kristin Shrader-Frechette*
Overview
Since 1987, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has spent more
than $3 billion to characterize and evaluate Yucca Mountain, Nevada as
a possible site for the world's first permanent facility to store high-level
radioactive waste and spent fuel from commercial reactors. 1 In 1992,
DOE completed the Early Site Suitability Evaluation (ESSE) and drew
positive conclusions regarding the suitability of every site factor
(volcanism, seismicity, human disruption, and so on).2 Residents of
the state of Nevada, however, disagree both with the conclusions of the
DOE and with the notion that they can trust DOE to conduct reliable site
studies. In fact, 80% of Nevadans are opposed to the proposed
facility.3
Although many factors - political, economic, and geological - are
responsible for the sharp disagreement between DOE and Nevadans,
one important controversy concerns DOE assessors' use of expert
judgment to estimate potential risks at Yucca Mountain. Indeed, even the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in its review of DOE
conclusions, warned that DOE "use of expert judgment... does not
* Professor Shrader-Frechette received her B.S. in physics from Xavier University
and her Ph.D. from Notre Dame University. She is Distinguished Research
Professor, Department of Philosophy and Center for Urban Ecology, University of
South Florida, as well as Editor-in-Chief for the monograph series, ENVIRONMENTAL
ETIMCS AND SCIENCE POLICY.
1 J.L. YOUNKER ET AL., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, REPORT OF EARLY SITE
SUrABILrrY EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIALREPOSTORY SITE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN,
NEVADA 1-13 (1992).
2 Id.
3 P. Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, 254
SCIENCE 1604 (1991).
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generally conform to the 'good practices' discussed" in typical NRC
documents; in particular, the NRC charged that many DOE analyses -
such as those dealing with risks from volcanism - were inadequately
conservative. 4 In this essay, we shall evaluate four classes of expert
judgments used in Yucca Mountain risk assessments. Although none of
these judgments was addressed by the NRC in its remarks, all of them
represent potential problems at the proposed Nevada site. These expert
judgments are (1) that short-term studies (a decade or less) provide an
adequate basis for extrapolating to long-term risks (ca 10,000 years); (2)
that models of site hydrogeology are reliable, even though they have not
been confirmed in the field; (3) that simplifications of site hydrogeology
do not misrepresent the actual situation; and (4) that sampling of site
characteristics is extensive enough and representative enough to provide
a basis for predicting future behavior at the site.
In this essay, we shall evaluate these classes of expert judgments
used in Yucca Mountain risk assessments, in order to determine the
extent to which, if any, the judgments may be responsible for erroneous
risk estimates. We shall argue that, because judgments (2)-(4) are
examples of faulty science, they do not necessarily show either that
there is a specific problem with the Yucca Mountain site or that there is a
general problem with geological disposal of radioactive waste. Rather,
they argue for greater conservatism in the Yucca Mountain studies.
Judgment (1), however, is so problematic that it appears to argue both
against the Yucca Mountain site and against permanent geological
disposal of high-level radioactive waste anywhere at present.
Our point in assessing these four classes of expert judgments is
neither that our survey is exhaustive nor that all such judgments ought to
be avoided. Some types of expert judgments are obviously unavoidable
in both science and risk assessment. Hence, the problem is not expert
judgments, as such, but the frequent absence of any ideas about the
limits of error or uncertainty associated with them in many Yucca
Mountain assessments, and the tendency of experts to be overconfident
about the effects of their judgments.
4 JOsEPH J. HOLONICREVW OFREPORT OFEARLY SITE SurrABIITY EVALuAION
OpTHE POTENTIALREPOSITORY SrIEAT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA 3 (1992).
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Judgments about Long-Term Risks
One of the most basic classes of expert judgments used in estimating
the risk of radionuclide migration (at Yucca Mountain and at other
proposed permanent sites) concerns extrapolations on the basis of short-
term studies. Indeed, geologists who are asked to make predictions
typically are forced to make expert judgments when they extrapolate
either to the past or to the future on the basis of what they observe in the
present. Often they use internal features, stratigraphy, and morphologic
expressions of rocks, for example - or general principles describing
dynamic geological processes operating through time - when they
make inferences about past geologic events.5 Frequently, for instance,
geologists use the absence of certain phenomena in the past and present
as evidence for denying the likelihood that a specific geologic process
will occur in the future. Yet, such an inference is questionable, because
one ought not simply assume from the absence of something that it was
never there and that it will never be there. As Watson points out, "it is a
non sequitur to argue from the absence of something [like given rock] in
the past to the conclusion that it will not be present in the future.' 6
There must also be other evidence, for example, for a process of rock
removal, in order for the inference to be reasonable. Likewise, there
must be "other evidence" when geologists extrapolate to the past or to
the future on the basis of present data. Geologists know that, in general,
the less we know about the processes and evidence supporting such
inferences/extrapolations/judgments, the greater is the likelihood that we
are wrong. Moreover, the smaller the empirical base used for such
extrapolation, all things being equal, the greater the chance that it is not,
or will not be, representative of past and future events and processes.
One problematic expert judgment made in many Yucca Mountain
studies is that short-term tests, (for several years or less) provide
adequate information for very precise predictions of long-term behavior,
for example, isolation of the waste for 10,000 years and container
5 See R. Watson, Explanation and Prediction in Geology, 77 J. GEOLOGY 488
(1969).
6 R.A. Watson, Absence as Evidence in Geology, 30 J. GEOLOGICAL EDUC.
300-01 (1982).
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integrity for 1,000 years.7 This judgment - about the validity of a
long-term inductive conclusion based on short-term data - is highly
controversial, in part because the extended time horizon for any high-
level repository is several times longer than recorded human history.8
As Massachusetts Institute of Technology geologist, K.V. Hodges, a
peer reviewer for the Yucca Mountain ESSE put it, the Congressional
mandate for siting a high-level repository is for predictive information
10,000 years into the future. Geology, however, as he points out, is an
explanatory and not a predictive science. 9 Or, as Dartmouth geologist
N. Oreskes noted: "the extrapolation of short-term to long-term studies
at Yucca Mountain flies in the face of 300 years of geological practice.
The question is, how did they get away with that?" 10 "Predictive
geology," according to Hodges, "is predicated on the assumption of a
sort of inverse uniformitarianism: the past geologic record is the key to
future geologic activity."1 1 Yet, at least since the recent revolution in
plate tectonics, uniformitarianism - in any precise, predictive sense-
has been largely abandoned by geologists. As Hodges continues: 12
7 See, e.g., J. BEAVERS & N. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON
CORROsIONINTHE TUFF REPOSrrORY (1990) (Item 118 in DOE, DE91000566); W.
Halsey, Selection Criteria for Container Materials at the Proposed Yucca Mountain
High Level Nuclear Waste Repository, in NACE CORROSION '90 (1990) (Item 60 in
DOE, DE91000566); J. Perry, A Linement Analysis of Yucca Mountain, Nevada:
The Proposed High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository, in 6TH THEMATIC CONFERENCE
ON REMOTE SENSING FOR EXPLORATION GEOLOGY: APPLICATIONS, TECHNOLOGY,
ECONOMICS (1988) (Item 135 in DOE, DE91000566); D. Dobson et al., Plans for
Characterization of the Potential Geologic Repository Site at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASIE
MANAGEMENT (1990) (Item 8 in DOE, DE91000566).
8 See G. SAwYER, REPORT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA'S COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR
PRojEcrs 73 (1990).
9 K.V. Hodges, Comment, in J.L. YOUNKER ET AL., REPORT OF THE PEER REVIEW
PANEL ON THE EARLY SITE SUITABILITY EVALUATION OF THE POTENTIAL REPOSITORY
Sm AT YUCCA MOUNTAINNEVADA 362 (1992).
10 N. Oreskes, Comments on Uncertainty, Expert Error, and Radioactive Waste 6
(unpublished remarks, Mar. 23, 1992).
11 Hodges, supra note 1, at 363.
12 id.
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earthquake prediction is one of the most visible examples of
predictive geology.., but it remains a hit-or-miss
proposition. Perhaps predictive geology will improve in the
future.., but DOE, the Congress, and the American people
need to confront the fact that the earth science community
does not have the tools necessary to generate models that
will permit the prediction of future tectonic activity with a
high degree of accuracy... tectonic predictions, when
stripped of statistical sound and fury, are not much better
than educated guesses.
Moreover, says Hodges, it is likewise "patently absurd" that we attempt
to predict the probability of volcanic disruptions over 10,000 years. In
asking for such predictions, claims Hodges, we are "asking the
impossible." 13
Indeed, the entire (14-person) DOE peer reviewer group for the
Yucca Mountain ESSE confirmed Hodges' conclusions about the
impossibility of reliable 10,000-year predictions for any waste
repository site. They said:14
many aspects of site suitability are not well suited for
quantitative risk assessment. In particular are predictions
involving future geological activity, future value of mineral
deposits and mineral occurrence models. Any projections of
the rates of tectonic activity and volcanism, as well as natural
resource occurrence and value, will be fraught with
substantial uncertainties that cannot be quantified using
standard statistical methods.
If the Yucca Mountain peer reviewers are correct, then obviously
making precise, long-term, geological predictions on the basis of short-
term data is questionable.
Although long-term prediction is a problem in any area of science,
the Yucca Mountain predictions are particularly problematic, as
compared to those in other areas of science not only because they deal
with thousands of years but also because the U.S. government
regulations require the predictions to be very precise (see later sections
of this essay for discussion of this point). They specify allowable levels
of radionuclide releases over thousands of years. Hence, it is the
13 Id., at 384.
14 YOUNKERET AL, supra note 1, at B-2, (Consensus Position).
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precision of the long-term predictions that make them more problematic
at Yucca Mountain than in other applications of science. Moreover, in
cases such as Yucca Mountain, precise, long-term predictions about
safety are especially questionable because the potential dose
commitments of radioactive isotopes (such as C-14, Pu-239 and 1-129)
- all with possibly serious health effects - extend from hundreds of
thousands to millions of years. 15 In other words, long-term, precise
predictions are more problematic in cases where their being wrong could
lead to a human or environmental disaster. Such a disaster is especially
worrisome because the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has explicitly warned that it is "impossible" to predict anything
regarding the success of radioactive waste management beyond 100
years. The agency has noted that institutional controls are particularly
problematic beyond a period of 100 years. 16 Indeed, when the state of
Nevada did a review of the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Plan
in 1989, focusing on the hydrogeological pathways for possible
radionuclide escape, one of its seven major "concerns" was using short-
term studies as the basis for long-term site predictions. 17
One of the main worries about making the judgment that a long-term
repository risk is acceptable, given only short-term, incomplete data, is
that some unforeseen catastrophic event could occur centuries from now
that would compromise the integrity of the long-term facility. Yet the
waste would be retrievable, according to U.S. regulations, for only 50
years after the repository is opened. 18 Because catastrophes have
occurred in the past, there are grounds for similar worries about
disruption of the waste-disposal facility. The U.S. landscape has a
number of craters created by meteor hits, for instance, some of which
(in Iowa and Arizona) are quite famous. Yet the annual probability of a
15 D. HAWKINs, CONsDERATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION CRITERIA FOR
RADIOACmW WASTE (1978).
16 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. CONSIDERATIONS OF ENVIRON-
mENTAL PROTECTION CRITERIA FOR RADIOACTIVE WASTE 10 (1978).
17 C.B. RALEIGH & THE PANEL ON COUPLED PROCESSES AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN
GROUND WATERAT YUCCA MOUNTAIN. How HIGH CAN 1T RISE? (1992).
18 See K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETrE. BURYING UNCERTAINTY: TME CASE AGAINST
GEOLOGICAL DIsPOSALOF NUCLEARWASTE, ch.2 (1993).
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meteor strike is quite low, just as the probability of repository flooding
is likely small. 19 When one is considering long-term predictions for
something like the Yucca Mountain repository, however, even events
likely having a low annual probability assume major proportions. In the
case of volcanism or seismic activity, for example, it is not necessary to
assume that the disruptive event would unearth the waste canisters.
Rather, even a small seismic dislocation of some geological features
might be sufficient to change the location and flow of groundwater that
could flood the repository and leach the waste. Moreover, even if the
per-year probability of dangerous seismic or volcanic activity is quite
low, for example, 10-6, this figure means that during the lifetime of the
repository such an event would be virtually certain. An annual
probability of 10-6 converts to a 10-3 likelihood over 1,000 years. This
is a quite high probability, and especially disconcerting when one
considers the possible catastrophic consequences.
Obviously, it is questionable whether one can make an inductive
prediction that guarantees the radwaste "permanent isolation from the
biosphere" - as several risk assessors claimed - on the basis of
inductive data obtained during only one or several decades. 2 0
Moreover, most of the Yucca Mountain experiments have been done and
data obtained over periods of far less than a decade. Investigations of
304 days duration and 9 years duration, for instance, have both been
called "long-term" studies.2 1 However, data from 6-, 11-, and 18-
month experiments, rather than multiple years, is more typical of Yucca
19 NEVADA NWPO, 1 STATE OF NEvADA COMMENIs ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY CONSULTATION DRAFr SITE CHARACrERIZATIoN PLAN, YUCCA MOUNTAIN
SrrE, NEVADA (1989)) (Item 335 in DOE, DE90006793).
20 3 R. Stein & P. Collyer, Pilot Research Projects for Underground Disposal of
Radioactive Wastes in the United States of America, in RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT.
(1984) (Item 157 in DOE, DE89005394).
21 K.G. KNAUSS E" AL, HYDROTHERMAL INTERACrIONOF SOID WAFERS OF TOPOPAH
SPR]NG TuFFwTH J-13 WATER AT 90 AND 150/DEGREE/C USING... LONG-TERM
Epa ,maN's (1987) (Item 18 in DOE, DE89005394); D. Hoffman et al., Review
of a Field Study of Radionuclide Migration from an Underground Nuclear Explosion
at the Nevada Test Site, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RADIOACTIvE WASTE
MANAGRENr (1983) (Item 140 in DOE, DE89005394).
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Mountain investigations. 22 Tests on migration of spent fuel and
groundwater transport of radionuclides, for example, are typically only
months in duration, for example, 2, 6, and 12 months. 23 Even for tests
as long as 3.5 years or 3 years duration, respectively, tests used to
determine the degree and extent of spent-fuel migration or the integrity
of the waste canisters, 24 researchers have been forced to extrapolate
and make the expert judgment that behavior over 3.5 years will be
representative of that over 10,000 or more years.
In the case of waste canisters, experiments of three years' duration
are particularly problematic, because the future temperatures in the
repository are expected to be as great as 2000 C in the immediate vicinity
of the waste, 25 causing changes in the surrounding rock.26 Moreover,
22 See, respectively, R. JACOBSON ET AL, A RECONNAISSANCE INVESTIGATION OF
HYDROGEOCHEMIS'IRYAND HYDROLOGY OFRANIER MESA (1986) (Item 183 in DOE,
DE89005394); KNAUSS ET AL., supra note 21; J. Bates & T. Gerding, Performance
of Actinide-Containing SRL 165 Type Glass in Unsaturated Conditions, in
SCIENTIFC BASIS FOR NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT 11 (M. Apted & R. Westerman,
eds. 1987(item 14 in DOE, DE89005394)).
23 H.D. SMITH, ELECTROCHEMICAL CORROSION-S COPING EXPERIMENTS: AN
EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS (1988) (Item 151 in DOE, DE90006793); H.D. SMITH,
INIIAL REPORT ON STRESS-CORROSION-CRACKING EXPERIMENTS USING ZIRCA.OY-4
SPENTFUELCLADDiNG C-RINGs (1988) (Item 153 in DOE, DE90006793).
24 J. Bates et al., Identification of Secondary Phases Formed During Unsaturated
Reaction of U02 with EJ-13 Water, in MATERIALS RESEARCH SOCIETY FALL
MEETING (1989) (Item 102 in DOE, DE90006793); J. Bates et al., Parametric
Effects of Glass Reaction Under Unsaturated Conditions, in MATERIALS RESEARCH
SOCETYFALL MEETING (1989) (Item 103 in DOE, DE90006793); McRIGHT ET AL.,
PROGRESS REPORTINTHE RESULTS OF TESTING ADVANCED CONCEPTUAL DESIGN METAL
BARRIER MATERIALS UNDER RELEVANT ENVIRONMENTAL CONDrIONS FOR A TUFF
REPOSITORY (1987) (Item 114 in DOE, DE90006793); see R. WESTERMAN ET AL,
CORROSION TESTING OF TYPE 304L STAINLESS STEEL IN TuFF GROUNDWATER
EXPERIMENTS (1987) (Item 135 in DOE, DE90006793; H. WEISS ET AL.,
METALURGICAL ANALYSIS OFA 304L STARLESS STEEL CANISTER FROM THE SPENT FUEL
TES NG-CIMAX (1985) (Item 119 in DOE, DE88004834).
25 C. HADLOCK, TECHNICAL SUPPORTOF STANDARDS FOR HIGH-LEVELRADIOACTIVE
WASTE MANAGEMENT, VOL D: RELEASE MECHANISMS 49 (1980).
26 j. BLACIC ET AL., EFFECTS OF LONG-TERM EXPOSURE OF TUFFS TO IIGH-LEVEL
NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSiTORY CONDITIONS, FINAL REPORT (1986) (Item 67 in DOE,
DE88004834).
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in some experiments, all of the canisters made of the nuclear waste-
package reference material have failed and showed stress-corrosion
cracking when they were exposed to a one-year test in groundwater and
tuff at the expected temperature of 200 ° C.2 7 Nevertheless, DOE
expects the canisters - presumably improved somehow - to last from
300 to 1,000 years. All of these problems suggest that long-term
experiments are essential. The shorter the time of the experiment, all
things being equal, the more questionable the value judgment that the
data support precise predictions about repository behavior thousands of
years in the future.
Loan companies find it difficult to predict mortgage rates for more
than 30 or 40 years, given nearly a century of information. Yet, DOE
risk assessors have predicted confidently that "meteorological
conditions.., for over 40 years" provide a firm basis for concluding
"that any radiological emissions would be effectively dispersed before
they reach highly populated areas" near a proposed permanent
repository. 2 8 How could one know about dispersion 10,000 years
hence? And how could one predict population centers so far into the
future? Of course, once a repository were built, the location of such a
facility might influence the place and growth of future cities.
Nevertheless, Las Vegas, as it exists today, would have been unlikely
50 years ago, before the Hoover Dam, and the fastest growing cities a
decade ago were not substantial even 100 years ago.2 9 Yet, risk
assessors, with far less inductive information, are attempting to predict
precise phenomena associated with permanent repository behavior and
its consequences for periods of time that are many orders of magnitude
longer. Many of the radioactive isotopes that would be stored at sites
like Yucca Mountain - such as 1-129, Np-237, Cs-135, U-238, Zr-93
27 S. Pitman et al., Corrosion and Slow-Strain-Rate Testing of Type 304L
Stainless in Tuff Groundwater Environments, in CORROSION '87 (1986) (Item 172
in DOE, DE88004834).
28 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 2 NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY Acr, ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, REFERENCE REPOSrIORY LOCATION, HANFORD SITE, WASHINGTON, at 6-
24 and 6-25 (1986).
29 P. O'BRIEN, TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT, TASK C REPORT: ASSESSMENT OF MIGRATION PATHWAYS 134 (1977).
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- have half lives that are in the millions of years.30 During such long
time periods of radiotoxicity, changes in climate, groundwater,
precipitation, and volcanic activity could occur.
Risk assessors, for example, need to predict precise phenomena
associated with future climate, weather, mineralogy and water
composition, even though climate and weather are the most variable and
rapid natural processes influencing the repository, and even though
mineral reactions are currently occurring there.3 1 Even DOE
researchers admit that "the climatic changes that are possible during the
next 10,000 years of Yucca Mountain may cause changes in the
hydraulic gradient.... The extent of these changes is uncertain." 3 2
Major variations in the climate of Nevada have occurred during the last
45,000 years, and the U.S. Geological Survey claims that future
changes probably will occur within the time the waste materials are
hazardous. 33 Precipitation patterns are likewise fluctuating, and
assessors must be able to predict them in perpetuity. The data, however,
covers only approximately the last 30 years, 34 yet 10,000-year
precipitation predictions are crucial to the safety of Yucca Mountain
because percolating water could infiltrate and transport radioactive
leachate, once the containers have been breached. Hence, to assume that
the 30-year precipitation data are adequate - for predicting the risks
associated with a permanent repository-represents an expert judgment
that is somewhat questionable, especially in light of the fact that both
precipitation and its variability appear to have increased at the site.35
30 See C. SMITH ET AL., POPULATION RISKS FROM DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVEL
RADIOACnvEWASTm N GEOLOGIC REPosrrORIEs 10, 51 (1982).
31 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY. Office of Scientific and Technical Information,
Project History, in YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECr BILIOGRAPHY, 1988-1989 vii-xvii
(Supp. 2 1990).
32 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, 2 NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT, ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE, NEVADA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AREA,
NEVADA, at 6-242 (1986).
33 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, VEGETATION AND CLIMATES OF THE LAST 45,000
YEARSINTHE VICINrIYOFTHE NEVADA TEST SrrE, SOUTH-CENTRAL NEVADA (1985)
(Item 394 in DOE, DE88004834).
34 R. FRENCH, DAILY, SEASONAL, AND ANNUAL PRECIPITATION AT THE NEVADA TEST
Srm, NEVADA (1986) (Item 186 in DOE, DE89005394).
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Ultimately, judgments that short-term data provide an adequate basis
for inferring extremely precise, long-term behavior rely on an inductive
inference, on the assumption that the future will be like the past. This is
the basic assumption of all historical geology. DOE has made exactly
this judgment every time it has concluded, for example: "Yucca
Mountain... would meet the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
standards.., if present hydrologic, geologic, and geochemical conditions
(as presently understood) persist for the next 10,000 years. ' 36 How
could one guarantee, however, that such conditions will persist?
Likewise, how could DOE justify its judgments that the future will be
like the past? DOE has concluded, for example, regarding the Yucca
Mountain site, that (1) "extreme weather phenomena are neither frequent
enough nor severe enough to be expected to significantly affect the
safety of repository operation." DOE has also claimed: (2) "no severe
meteorological conditions have been recorded or are expected to occur in
the region that would contribute to radionuclide releases." Even more
surprisingly, DOE has affirmed: (3) "on the basis of the geologic
record, no dissolution [of subsurface rock] is expected during the first
10,000 years after repository closure, or thereafter." 37 How could one
affirm that there will never be rock dissolution at Yucca Mountain? Or
that neither "extreme weather" nor "severe meteorological conditions"
will occur at the site? Do DOE assessors have enough data to make these
predictions? When the time periods at issue are so great, inductive
judgments such as these are extremely questionable. Long-term
judgments about the suitability of Yucca Mountain for a waste
repository are especially questionable because of the existence of lakes
in the Great Basin of Nevada during the Wisconsin period - 2 million
years ago - and because moderate variations in climate are sufficient to
35 See J. BRAITHWAITE & F. NIMICK, EF'EcT OF Hosr-RocK DIssoLUnoN AND
PRECIPITATION ON PERMEABILrY IN A NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY IN TUFF (1984)
(Item D161 in DOE, NVO-96-24 (REV. 5)); R. FRENCH, EFFECTS OF THE LENGTH OF
RECORD ON ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL AND SEASONAL PRECIPITAION AT THE NEVADA TEST
SrrE, NEVADA (1987) (Item 220 in DOE, DE89005394).
36 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 6-298 to 6-299.
37 Id., The three quotes are, respectively, at 6-32,6-32, and 6-257.
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cause large changes in the hydrological budget of some of the closed
basin systems in Nevada.3 8 An evaluation of the Quaternary history of
the Yucca Mountain area reveals that, like other locations proposed for
radwaste sites, it has undergone geomorphic change in the last million
years, and it may undergo catastrophic landslides in the future. 39 Other
assessors have calculated the probability of a volcanic disruption hazard,
given the natural historic seismicity of the Yucca Mountain region as 10-
6 per year.4 0
Expert judgments about precise, long-term predictability at Yucca
Mountain are also questionable in light of the fact that some assessors
argue that the water table at Yucca Mountain could rise 130 meters if
precipitation increased by 100%. 4 1 This is a significant and possible
increase, since average precipitation levels, for a decade, often vary by
two orders of magnitude.4 2 At Yucca Mountain, for example, water
tables stood at 926 meters (approximately 2,938 feet) only 14,000 years
ago. High water tables were northeast of the Nevada Test Site (NTS)
until only 7,000 years ago, and on the NTS 700,000 years ago.4 3 On
the other hand, some assessors claim that the water table at Yucca
Mountain was never more than 200 feet above its present position,44
38 L. Benson, Effect of Paleoclimatic Fluctuations on the Transport of
Radionuclides from Potential Waste Disposal Sites in the Great Basin of the
Western United States, 3 EARTH SCL 7 (1980) (Item 90 in DOE, DE89005394).
39 S. MARA, ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS OF GEOLOGIC ISOLATION SYSTEMS.
GEOLOGIC FACrORs IN THE ISOLATIONOF NUCLEAR WASTE EVALUATION OF LONG-TERM
GEOMORPHIC PROCESSES AND CATASTROPHIC EVENTS (1980) (Item 92 in DOE,
DE89005394).
40 L. METCALF, PRELIMINARY REVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE POTENTIAL FOR
TECTONIC, SEISMIC, AND VOLCANIC ACTIVTY ATTHE NEVADA TEST SITE DEFENSE
WASTE DISPOSAL SITE (1983) (Item 142 in DOE, DE89005394); See also B. CROWE,
VOLCANIC HAZARD ASSESSMENT FOR DISPOSAL OF HIGH-LEVELRADIOACIVE WASIE
(1986).
41 j. Czarnecki, Characterization of the Subregional Groundwater Flow System of a
Potential Site for a High-level Nuclear Waste Repository (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1988) (Item 278 in DOE, DE90006793).
42 T. DUNNE & L. LEOPOLD, WATER IN ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 52, 54, 70
(1978).
43 J. DAVIS, DESERT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GEOLOGICAL RECONNAISSANCE AND
CHRONOLoGIC STUDIES (1983) (Item 143 in DOE, DE89005394).
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and that radwaste will be emplaced more than 650 feet below the surface
and more than 600 feet above the water table.4 5 The water table is
currently between 728 and 775 feet above sea level.4 6 Even if there
were a significant climate change and a doubling of rainfall, a recent
(1992) panel of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) argued
that the water table at Yucca Mountain would rise, at most, by 400 feet;
although this is a significant rise, the panel concluded that the proposed
repository would not be at risk of groundwater infiltration. 47 Such
conclusions appear reassuring until one realizes that the same NAS
panel warned that its modeling results involve very "large uncertainty,"
that there are few data to constrain the complex hydrologic system at
Yucca Mountain, and that its predictions "depend heavily on expert
judgment" because of the "unprecedented" exactitude required for
10,000-year predictions.4 8 Because high-level radwaste requires
essentially "permanent isolation from the biosphere," 4 9 some
geologists have said that any planned repository must be built under the
assumption that groundwater will eventually come in contact with the
high-level waste. 50 DOE, however, has continued to assume that,
because the water table has been constant for several decades, therefore,
it is likely to remain so in the future.
Making the expert judgment that short-term hydrogeological tests
provide accurate predictions for long-term behavior has been one of the
reasons for the erroneous underestimation of the potential for offsite
44 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NNWSI History, in BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE
PUBLISHED REPORTS, PAPERS, AND ARTICLES ON THE NEVADA NUCLEAR WASm
STORAGE INVESGATIONS 1-30 (1985).
45 H. MAcDOUGALLET AL, 3 SITE CHARAcTmRIzATION PLAN: CONCEPiuALDESIGN
REPORT, in NEVADA NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE INVESTIGATIONS PRoJEcT, APP. A-E
(1987) (Item 177 in DOE, DE90006793).
46 J. ROBINSON, WATER LEVELS IN PERIODICALLY MEASURED WELLSNTHE YUCCA
MOUNTAIN AREA, NEVADA. 1981-1987 (1988) (Item 271 in DOE, DE90006793).
See also RALEIGH, supra note 17.
47 RALEIGH, supra note 17.
48 Id. at 7, 122 & 135.
49 Stein & Collyer, supra note 20.
50 I. ROXBURGH, GEOLOGYOF HGH-LEVELNUCLEARWAST DISPOSAL 183 (1987).
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radwaste migration at the low-level radioactive waste facility at Maxey
Flats, Kentucky. Although the Maxey Flats site is disanalogous in many
ways with the proposed Yucca Mountain site, several problematic risk-
assessment methods appear to be similar at the two locations. The
geologist (from the New Jersey Geological Survey) who did the original
studies at the Kentucky location drilled and studied the wells for only 10
days. As a result, he concluded that they were dry, and that hydraulic
conductivity was very low at the site.5 1 On the basis of his analyses,
the Kentucky facility was opened the year he did his studies. Other
geologists and risk assessors, years later, observed the wells for a year
and concluded that, because some of them were filled with water,
therefore hydraulic conductivity was quite high.52 Just as the longer-
term studies gave the more accurate results - and a less optimistic
picture of the Maxey Flats radioactive waste site - so also there is
reason to question the expert judgment that short-term studies at
proposed high-level sites, like Yucca Mountain, provide accurate data
for precise, long-term predictions. Moreover, as we have already
argued, given the longevity of the proposed Nevada site, the problems
related to expert judgments about long-term predictions at other sites,
and the difficulties with accurate geological predictions, there is reason
to believe that this judgment is problematic. It poses a serious difficulty
for any proposal to site a permanent geological repository either at
Yucca Mountain or anywhere else, on grounds of the supposition that
precise, long-term predictions about hydrogeology are reliable.
Judgments about Model Reliability
A more basic expert judgment is not only that one can predict long-
term geological behavior on the basis of short-term data, but that one
can model a geologically heterogeneous site, like Yucca Mountain, with
"highly nonlinear" flow characteristics, 53 and that such models provide
51 I. WALKER, GEOLOGIC AND HYDROGEOLOGICEvALUATIONOFA PROPOSED SITE.... 3
(1962).
52 S. PAPADOPULOS & I. WINOGRAD, STORAGE OF LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WAS
INTFIE GROUND: HYDROGEOLOGIC AND HYDROCHEMICALFACTORS 29-30 (1974).
53 N. Bixier & R. Eaton, Modeling of Multiphase Flow in Permeable Media: (1)
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adequate and precise knowledge upon which to base future predictions
about radwaste migration. Such judgments about the adequacy of
modeling are questionable, both because the models cannot be validated
in the field over the long term and because, if empirical data were
available, one would not need to employ models in the first place.
Admittedly, one can often determine that a given model is probably
wrong, as does Watson when he criticizes the chronostratigraphic model
on the grounds that it is false to Earth history, and that it gives rise to
pseudo-problems of correlation and inclusion.54 Typically, however,
one does not have the data to confirm a long-term geological model.
Assessors are forced to use models to evaluate all proposed repository
sites, simply because they have inadequate data and theories to use in
characterizing the area over the long term.5 5 They do not know how
the hydrology, geology, waste packages, and so on, will perform over
centuries, and so they use models of the situation - Monte Carlo
simulations, for example.56
One frequent rationale, for substituting modeling and simulations for
actual empirical testing, is that modeling and simulations have been used
before, in assessing the probability of nuclear accidents. 57 Probabilities
related to nuclear accidents, however, are notoriously inaccurate. For
example, all of the accident-frequency values obtained from operating
experience in U.S. nuclear reactors fall outside the 90% confidence
band of calculated expert probabilities in the best nuclear risk
assessment ever performed (WASH 1400).58 Different assessors'
Mathematical Model; (2) Analysis of Imbibation and Drying Experiments, in
GORDAN RESEARCH CONFERENCE ON MODELING OFFLOWIN PERMEABLE MEDIA (1986)
(Item 187 in DOE, DE90006793).
54 R. Watson, A Critique of Chronostratigraphy, 283 AM. J. Sci. 173 (1983); see
also R. Watson & H. Wright, The End of the Pleistocene: A General Critique of
Chronostratigraphic Classification, 9 BOREAS 153 (1980).
55 L. Ramspott, Assessment of Engineered Barrier System and Design of Waste
Packages, in AM. NUCLEAR SOC'Y ANNUAL MEETiNG (1988) (Item 147 in DOE,
DE90006793).
56 C. COOPER, NumERicAL SIMULATION OF GAS FLOW THROUGH UNSATURATED
FRACrURED ROCK AT YUCCA MOUNTAiN, NEvADA (1990).
57 C. SASTREETAL,WASTEPACKAGE RELIABILITY 22 (1986).
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probability estimates associated with various reactor events typically
vary by four orders of magnitude.59 Hence, the use of nuclear-accident
simulations does not necessarily provide a justification for the expert
judgment that repository modelling is reliable. Indeed, speaking for the
state, the Nevada Attorney General criticized DOE and its assessors for
doing modeling of the Yucca Mountain site, modeling that depends on
major untested assumptions, without validating the models in the field;
spokespersons for the state of Nevada also warned that the uncertainty
in the models (for possible radionuclide transport) was one of their
seven major "concerns" about the reliability of Yucca Mountain
studies.60 Many risk assessors, however, typically assume that models
alone are sufficient to demonstrate the acceptability of a particular
repository site. They repeatedly affirm that such models, together with
computer codes, "demonstrate the safety of a final storage site for
nuclear wastes." 6 1
Much of the problem with model uncertainty in the risk assessments
of repository sites arises from the fact that all the laws and theories used
to explain site characteristics and possible radwaste migration are based
on highly idealized notions. Many assessors at Yucca Mountain, for
example, use highly idealized continuum models (such as porous-media
models) - that assume the underlying rock is solid and unfractured -
rather than discontinuum models formulated to account for the effects of
discrete fractures. 62 They do so because continuum models are simpler
58 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY, REPORT No.
(NUREG-75/014) WASH-1400 (1975).
59 See SHRADER-FRECHETE, supra note 18, at ch. 6; and R. COOKE, SUBJECTIVE
PROBABILITYAND EXPERT OPINION, ch. 9 (1991).
60 NEVADA NWPO, 1 STATE OF NEVADA COMMENTS ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY CONSULTATION DRAFT SrrE CHARACTERIZATION PLAN, YUCCA MOUNTAIN
SITE, NEVADA (1989) (Item 335 in DOE, DE90006793); 2 NEVADA NWPO, STATE OF
NEVADA COMMENTs ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY CONSULTATION DRAFT SITm
CRARACTERizATION PLAN, YUCCA MOUNTAIn SrrE, NEVADA (1989) (Item 336 in
DOE, DE90006793).
61 See, e.g., G. Bertozzi et al., Long-Term Risk Assessment of Geological
Disposal, in RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DIsPOSAL 639, 647 (R. Simon,
ed. 1986).
62 M. BOARD, EXAMINATION OFTHE USE OF CONTINUUM VERSUS DISCONTINUUM
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and more efficient to use, and because they have no superior
alternatives. 6 3 Assessors also employ continuum models on the
grounds that matrix flow predominates over fracture flow at Yucca
Mountain, a highly questionable assumption.64 Hence, there are a
variety of reasons for believing that the idealized hydrogeological
models at Yucca Mountain may not be accurate. 65 Indeed, external
reviewers argue forcefully that, in general, the quality control on the
Yucca Mountain modeling is poor.66
Another example of idealized, therefore questionable, judgments
used in repository assessments are those that assume Darcy's Law is an
accurate way to represent Yucca-Mountain site hydrogeology. Virtually
all of the risk assessments that discuss transport time of groundwater at
radwaste sites rely ultimately on variants of Darcy's Law.6 7 It states
that groundwater flow velocity is proportional to the hydraulic gradient.
MODELS FOR DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT FOR THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE
(1989); T. BRIKowsK, YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROGRAM SUMMARY OF RESEARCH, SITE
MONITORING AND TEcHNICALREVIEW AcnvmES (JANUARY 1987-JUNE 1988) (1988);
C. COOPER, supra note 56; see GEOTRANS INC., REvIEW OF MODELING EFFORTS
ASSOCIATED WrIH YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA 9 (1986).
63 Id. at66.
64 See J. Lemons & D. Brown, The Role of Science in the Decision to Site a
High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, USA, 10 THE
ENVIRONMENTALIST, 7 (1990).
65 T. BRIKOWSKI, YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROGRAM SUMMARY 75 (1988).
66 GEOTRANS INC., supra note 62, at 1.
67 See, e.g., S. SINNOCK & T. LIN. PRELIMINARY BOUNDS ON THE EuECIED
POSTC.OSURE PERFORMANCE OF THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY SITE, SOUTiERN
NEVADA 8 (1984); SINNOCK ET AL, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF GROUNDWATER
TRAVEL TIME AND RADIONUCLIDE TRANSPORT AT THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN REPOSITORY
SITE 8 (1986); E. JACOBSON, INVESTIGATION OF SENSrnVrY AND UNCERTATIY IN
SOME HYDROLOGIC MODELS OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND VICINITY 5 (1984); F.
THOMPSON Er AL, PRELDMNARY UPPER-BOUND CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS FOR A WASTE
REPOSITORY AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NEVADA iii (1984); N. HAYDEN, BENCHMARKING
NNMSI FLOW AND TRANSPORT CODES: COVE 1 RESULTS 1-3 (1985); 1 A. DUDLEY ET
AL., TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT CODE (TOSPACO): PHYSICAL AND
MATHEMATICALBASES: YUCCAMOUNTAIN PROJECT 36-44 (1988) (Item 182 in DOE,
DE90006793); C. SMITH ET AL, supra note 30, at 39; Y. LIN, SPARTON - A SIMPLE
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT CODE FOR THE NEVADA NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE
DESTIGATIONS PROJEcr i (1985); BOARD, supra note 62, at 13,17.
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This law, however, is an empirical, causal, and mathematical
idealization. 68 Describing flow in porous media, Darcy's Law assumes
that flow occurs through the entire cross section of the material, rather
than through pores and between solids, as actually happens. The law
further assumes that velocity is uniform and the path straight, and it
relies on average values of hydraulic variables applicable to volume
elements. Moreover, because the corrections in Darcy's Law, needed to
make it applicable to a particular site, must be based on laboratory or
field results and do not come from the fundamental law itself, it is not
obvious that good scientific theory actually supports some of the
generalizations in which Darcy's Law is employed. For example, its use
at Yucca Mountain is particularly problematic, in part because the law is
not suitable for conditions of fracture flow.6 9
Of course, hydrogeologists might argue, in most situations, that the
idealizations and expert judgments central to models based on Darcy's
Law are not significant, and that they could lead only to minor errors.
However, the combined effect of numerous subjective judgments and
small errors might be great, particularly in a situation of fracture flow.
After all, siting a high-level radwaste repository requires long-term
hydrogeological prediction, very slow groundwater migration time, and
adequate information in the present. Such requirements mean that it is
impossible to confirm that the Yucca-Mountain laboratory and field
results used in connection with Darcy's Law are accurate. Hence the
problem of idealization remains. 7 0 In his classic essay on
methodology, Milton Friedman claimed that idealizations were a
problem in science only to the degree that the predictions resulting from
them could not be checked. Because predictions for sites like Yucca
68 See K. Shrader-Frechette, Values and Hydrogeological Method: How Not to
Site the World's Largest Nuclear Dump in PLANNING FOR CHANGING ENERGY
CONDITIONS, ENERGY POLICY STUDIES (J. Byrne and D. Rich, eds. 1988); K. Shrader-
Frechette, Idealized Laws, Antirealism, and Applied Science: A Case in
Hydrogeology, 81 SYNTHESE 329 (1989).
69 See 3 R. Loux, COMMENTS ON THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITE
CHARACrERIZAION PLAN, YUCCA MOUNTAIN SrrE, NEVADA 6 (1989).
70 See N. CARTWRiGHT, HowTHE LAWS OF PHYSICS LIE 111 (1983); Shrader-
Frechette, supra note 68.
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Mountain cannot be checked over the long term, it is clear that they
remain part of a classical scientific problem. 71
The expert judgments about the adequacy of modeling proposed
repository sites are also more questionable than those in many other
areas of science because the site specifications to which the models must
conform are sometimes very precise and therefore could be quite
difficult to meet. For example, in the Yucca Mountain case, assessors
are required to guarantee, by virtue of 10 CFR 60.113, "substantially
complete containment" within the waste packages for 300 to 1,000 years
and a controlled release rate from the engineered barrier system for
10,000 years of 1 part in 105 per year for radionuclides present in
defined quantities 100 years after permanent closure. 72 Given such
precise requirements for the Yucca Mountain repository, it is
questionable whether a simulation, a model, of the site could provide
information that is firm enough to meet such specific requirements. The
more stringent the site specifications, the more accurate must be the
information used to meet the specifications. Hence, the expert judgment
about the accuracy of modeling is questionable because of the long time
frame of the prediction, the specificity of the requirements, and the fact
that the simulation or model cannot be checked. Despite these three
problems, most risk assessors base their Yucca Mountain conclusions
on a variety of sophisticated models.7 3 Yet, only rarely do assessors
71 See M. Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in THE PHILO-
SOPHYOFFECONOMICS (D. Hausman, ed. 1984).
72 See A. Berusch & E. Gause, DOE Progress in Assessing the Long Term
Performance of Waste Materials, in SCIENCE BASIS FOR NUCLEAR WASM
MANAGEMENT X (J. Bates and W. Seefeldt, eds. 1987) (Item 190 in DOE,
DE89005394).
73 See. e.g., D. Zyvoloski, Simulation of Heat Transfer in the Unsaturated Zone,
in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACriVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
(1990) (Item 23 in DOE, DE91000566); K. Karasaki et al., Building of a
Conceptual Model at UE25-c Hole Complex, in id (Item 35 in DOE,
DE91000566); T. Wolery et al., The EQ316 Software Package for Geochemical
Modeling, in AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETYNATIONAL MEErING (1988) (Item 45 in
DOE, DE91000566); A. RICHARDSON, YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECT: PRELIMINARY
SHAFrLINER DESIGN CRnERtIA AND MEMODOLOGY GUIDE (1990) (Item 69 in DOE,
DE91000566); J. KOTERAS, STUDIES OF COMPUTATIONAL MODELS FOR JONTED MEDIA
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openly admit that their models are uncertain by being based mainly on
"conceptual designs."74 Thus, expert judgments about the adequacy of
modelling appear to have at least the potential to cause serious errors in
QRA conclusions about Yucca Mountain and other proposed sites.
Judgments about Simplification of the Phenomena
Because real hydrogeological systems at proposed repository sites
like Yucca Mountain are often quite complex, risk assessors frequently
must make a further expert judgment that the simplifications of their
models do not seriously misrepresent the situation they are attempting to
understand and to predict. Indeed, risk assessors admit that
simplifications of many hydrogeological phenomena are necessary in
order to formulate analytic solutions to problems of hydraulic
conductivity, infiltration, and so on.75 According to the way that we
are using the term "simplicity," one model or theory has more simplicity
if it postulates fewer principles, laws, properties, or entities than
another. 7 6 To render the real hydrogeological system at Yucca
Mountain mathematically and scientifically tractable, for example, risk
assessors have had to make partially subjective judgments about
simplifying the situation.7 7 These include simplifications such as that
all radionuclides have identical transport retardation factors, or that all
radionuclide releases are instantaneous. 78
WITH ORTHOGONAL SETS OF JOINTS (1990) (Item 70 in DOE, DE91000566); L.
Costin, Application of Models for Jointed Rock to the Analysis of Prototype
Testing for the Yucca Mountain Project, in U.S. SYMPOSIUM ON ROCK MECHANICS
(1990) (Item 81 in DOE, DE91000566); R. Glass, Laboratory Research Program to
Aid in Developing and Testing the Validity of Conceptual Models for Flow and
Transport through Unsaturated Porous Media, in GEOVAL '90 (1990) (Item 83 in
DOE, DE91000566).
74 For one such admission, see DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 6-52
& 6-69.
75 See, e.g., 2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY AC',
ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENT, DAVIS CANYON SITE, UTAH 6-120 (1986).
76 See K. Shrader-Frechette, Three Arguments Against Simplicity, in AESTHETIC
FACTORS IN NATURAL SCIENCE (N. Rescher, ed. 1990).
77 See, e.g., DUDLEY ET AL, supra note 67.
78 F. Gelbard et al., One-Dimensional Radionuclide Transport Under Time-
Varying Conditions, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE
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Other common simplifications in permanent-repository risk
assessments are that water flow will be one-dimensional; 7 9 that
percolation will be downward only through the unsaturated zone, but
horizontal through the saturated zone;80 that temperature and moisture
are constant 81 or that there is a normal distribution of cumulative
releases of radionuclides to the water table.82 All of these partially
subjective judgments about simplification have been made at Yucca
Mountain, even though they are almost certainly counterfactual, and
even though they have been criticized by external reviewers. 83
Schedule constraints also often force a number of simplifications in
risk studies. 84 Such simplifications obviously are not completely
accurate representations of the real world but, in the case of Yucca
Mountain, assessors make the partially subjective judgment that they are
accurate enough to describe the phenomena. This judgment is
problematic, of course, to the degree that the simplifications are likely to
underemphasize the likelihood of radwaste migration. At least three
WASEMANAGEMENT (1989) (Item 123 in DOE, DE91000566); see also, e.g., B.
SAGAR & A. RUNCHAL, AMATHEMATICALMODELFORFLUID FLOW, HEAT, AND MASS
TRANSPORT IN VARIABLY SATURATED GEOLOGICAL MEDIA (1990) (Item 131 in DOE,
DE91000566).
79 COOPER, supra note 56; DUDLEY ET AL., supra note 67, at 1; JACOBSON, supra
note 67, at 12; B. TRAviS ET AL., PRELMINARY ESTIMATES OF WATER FLOW AND
RADIONUCLIDETRANSPORTIN YuccA MOUNTAIN 3 (1984); R. PETERS, THE EFFECt OF
PERCOLATION RATE ON WATER TRAVEL TIME IN DEEP, PARTIALLY SATURATED ZONES i
(1986); SASTRE ET AL., supra note 57, at 24; LIN, supra note 67, at 1; SINNOCK,
supra note 67, at 66.
80 SINNOCK, supra note 67, at 5 & 13.
81 L. MONDYET AL, COMPARISON OF WASTE EMPLACEMENT CONFIGURATIONS FOR A
NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY IN TUFF: IV: THERMO-HYDROLOGICAL ANALYSIS 6
(1983).
82 SINNocK Er AL, supra note 67, at 80.
83 GEOTRANS, supra note 62, at 11, 13; THOMPSON ENGINEERING COMPANY,
REVIEw AND COMMENT ON THEU.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITE CHARACTERIZATION
PLAN CONCEPTuALDESIGNREPORT 1-15 (1988) (Item 329 in DOE, DE90006793).
84 T. NELSON ET AL, YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECr WASTE PACKAGE DESIGN FOR MRS
[MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE] SYSTEM STUDIES (1989) (Item 132 in DOE,
DE90006793).
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factors illustrate the underestimating effect of simplifications. Models
that do not consider the growth of Ra-226 and other radionuclides in the
long-lived decay chain stemming from the uranium and plutonium in the
waste underestimate the health hazards of the waste.85 Likewise,
oversimplifying physical processes in the unsaturated zone and
biological and chemical processes in the entire groundwater system may
lead to underestimation of radionuclide transport and health hazards; if
one assumes that adsorption of radionuclides reduces their public
hazard, one may thereby forget that adsorbed radionuclides in the
unsaturated zone may act as a very long-term contaminant source to the
underlying saturated zone.86
A third example of simplification that causes an underestimation of
risk has to do with synergism. Assessors typically assume that many
hydrogeological variables - such as percolation flux, hydraulic
conductivity, effective matrix porosity, and fracture porosity - are
independent; they make this assumption of independence because they
do not have data that enable them to correlate the variables. 87 Yet,
obviously the combined effects of at least some of these factors could
enhance the velocity of waste or water transport. Indeed, regarding
Yucca Mountain, outside evaluators have argued that oversimplifications
in the description of relevant hydrogeology compromise the scientific
integrity of the site characterization plan. 88
The expert judgment that phenomena and models may be simplified,
in order to provide an acceptable description and explanation of the site,
is problematic in part because simplicity is not always a good criterion
for theory acceptability in science. It is not always a good criterion,
because if two empirically underdetermined or vague theories were both
equally able to account for certain empirical results, then scientists
following a criterion of simplicity could be forced to choose a crude,
suspect, single-factor theory, simply because it was the simpler of the
85 SMrIHETAL, supra note 30, at 183.
86 E. REICHARD ET AL, GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION RISK ASSESSMENT 180
(1990).
87 SINNOCK ET AL, supra not 67 at 79.
88 THOMPSONENG4EERINGCOMPANY, supra note 83.
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two. More generally, as Friedman has pointed out, using simplicity to
choose among theories, all of which are consistent with the facts, is
bound to lead to counterintuitive conclusions about the most acceptable
scientific theory. This is because, for any such theory, there is a simpler
one also consistent with the facts. Hence, because science strives for
strong - not safe - hypotheses, using simplicity as a criterion for
theory choice in science could lead to accepting theories that are weaker
with respect to explanatory power.89 Moreover, using simplicity as a
criterion for theory choice in explaining characteristics of proposed
repository sites is more problematic than in other areas of science.
Given the inadequacy of the data and the heterogeneity of the Yucca
Mountain site, for example, it is not clear that the simplified explanatory
premises have a very high probability of being true.
In a highly applied risk-assessment situation, choosing a theory on
the basis of simplicity, even though the empirical data are highly
underdetermined, could lead to dangerous consequences. In such a case
it might be better to admit that there is no adequate theory. For example,
if one admitted that the simplified theories used to predict radwaste
migration at Yucca Mountain might be inadequate, then this admission
might have the virtue of preventing a questionable theory from being
used as the basis for public policy that declares Yucca Mountain
acceptable. The oversimplified models and theories used at Yucca
Mountain bring to mind some of the scientific, health, and policy
problems that arose when scientists and risk assessors made similar
simplifications at the Maxey Flats low-level radwaste facility. Just as at
Yucca Mountain, many of the Maxey Flats' scientists simplified the
situation by assuming that there was only vertical movement of water
above the water table. Yet, offsite migration at the Kentucky facility
occurred in part through horizontal movement above the water table,9 0
horizontal movement ruled out on the basis of an expert judgment.
89 N. Goodman, Safety, Strength, Simplicity, 28 PrIM. Sci. 150 (1961); K.
Friedman, Empirical Simplicity as Testability, 23 BRIT. J. PHIL ScL 25 (1972);
Shrader-Frechette, supra note 76.
90 K. WILSON & B. LyoNs, GROUND-WATERLEvEIs AND TRIuM CONCENTRATIoNs
AT THE MAXEY-FLATS Low-LEVEL RADIOAcTivE WASTE DISPoSAL SITE NEAR
MOREHEAD. KENTuCKY, JUNE 1984 TO APijm 1989 20 (1991).
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Likewise, approximately 20 years ago, there was a conflict between
two groups of geologists evaluating the groundwater-flow theories for
the proposed radwaste site in Maxey Flats, Kentucky. The geologists
from several universities (Georgia Tech and Auburn, among others) and
from several consulting groups and industries (primarily EMCON and
Nuclear Engineering Company, NECO) used an extremely simple,
single-factor flow theory, premised completely on the low permeability
of the shale on site. They concluded that the radwaste could not migrate
offsite for centuries. 9 1 The geologists from several government
agencies (USGS and EPA) rejected the simple flow theory of the
academic and industry geologists and claimed that many factors - such
as possible fissures, fractures, and hairline cracks between bedding
planes - not merely the low permeability of the shale, had to be taken
into account.9 2 Offering a theory with less simplicity and more
explanatory parameters and properties, they claimed that radwaste could
well migrate offsite. Because groundwater flow on the Maxey Flats site
was so slow and so difficult to monitor directly, both theories were
empirically underdetermined and hence equally consistent with the facts.
As a result, policy makers chose the theory with more simplicity, the
low permeability theory of the industry and academic geologists. Their
choice has proved dangerously wrong, because plutonium travelled
offsite only several years after the facility was opened.93 Maxey Flats
became known as "the world's worst nuclear dump." 94 The moral of
91 EMCON ASSOCIATES & J. MCCOLLOUGH, GEOTECHNICAL INVESIGATION AND
WASTE MANAGEMENT STUDIES, NUCLEAR WASTE DIsPosAL SITE, FLEMING COUNTY,
KENTUCKY, PROJECT 108-5.2 (1975) (Unpublished report, available from EMCON,
326 Commercial Street, San Jose, California).
92 D. Polluck & H. Zehner, A Conceptual Analysis of the Ground-Water Flow
System at the Maxey Flats Radioactive Waste Burial Site, Fleming County,
Kentucky, U.S. Geological Survey Open-File Report, in MODELING AND Low-LEvEL
WASTE MANAGEMENT (C. Little and L. Stratton, eds. 1981); E. WERNER, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SuRvEY, JOINT INTENSITY SURvEY IN THE MOREHEAD KENTUCKY AREA
(1980) (unpublished study).
93 G. MEYER, MAXEYFLATSRADIOACIhVE WAsTEBURIAL SITE: STATUS REPORT 9
(1975) (unpublished report).
94 W. Naedele, Nuclear Grave Is Haunting Kentucky, Philadelphia Bulletin, May
17, 1979, at 1-3, in U.S. Geological Survey, Maxey Flats - Publicity, Vertical
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the story is that the greater the empirical underdetermination of theories
and models, the more dangerous it is to evaluate them in terms of the
criterion of simplicity, alone, because the more likely it is that many
"simple" theories are all consistent with the limited data. In the case of
Yucca Mountain, the empirical underdetermination of the site is quite
serious. Several DOE peer reviewers noted that modeling of flow at the
site is "to a large extent based on simplifying assumptions which have
not been fully verified by field observations." 95
Judgments about the Reliability of Sampling
One of the expert judgments that is most crucial to the
simplifications necessary to model any repository site is that sampling
- via boreholes, wells, groundwater, or volcanic tuff cores -
provides an adequate empirical base for predicting hydrogeological
behavior at the location. At Yucca Mountain, DOE risk assessors have
made a number of expert judgments about sampling. They made the
judgments, for example, that hydraulic-conductivity values obtained
from the southeastern part of the Yucca Mountain area "are
representative of the values along the flow path."'96 In arriving at such
judgments about the representativeness of their sampling, they subjected
cores of tuff, for instance, to a variety of stresses in order to infer,
inductively, how it might behave as a high-level waste repository. They
also took samples of special glass and irradiated it for given periods in
order to determine the leach rates of various radioactive elements. 97
File, Louisville, KY Water Resources Div., U.S. Dept. Interior); F. Browning, The
Nuclear Wasteland, 7 NEW TIMES 43 (1976).
95 YOUNKER Er AL, supra note 9, at 423 (D.K. Kreamer).
96 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 32, at 6-162.
97 For tuff sampling, see, e.g., C. Voss & L. Shotwell, An Investigation of the
Mechanical and Hydrologic Behavior of Tuff Fractures Under Saturated Conditions,
in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACIIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
(1990) (Item 40 in DOE, DE91000566); see also R. PETERS ET AL., FRACTURE AND
MATRIX HYDROLOGIC CHARACrERISTICS OF TUFFACEOUS MATERIALS FROM YuCCA
MOUNTAIN,NYE COUNTY, NEVADA (1984) (Item D170 in DOE, NVO-96-24 (REV.
5)). For sampling of properties of glass see, e.g., T. ABRAJANO ET AL., TE
REACTION OF GLASS DURING GAMMA IRRADIATION IN A SATURATED TUFF
ENVIRONMENT, Part 3, LONG-TERM EXPERIMENTS AT 1 X 104 RAD/HOUR (1988) (Item
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Likewise, they subjected samples of spent fuel to tests, for thousands of
hours, to determine the rate of oxidation. 98 In addition, they examined
samples from two deep boreholes in order to draw conclusions about
the nature of the aquifer.99
In all their sampling activities, Yucca Mountain researchers have
typically made the expert judgment that a given number of boreholes or
tuff samples, e.g., 2, 7, 20, 29, were sufficient and were representative
enough to enable them to draw reliable inductive conclusions about site
characteristics such as fracture transmissivity, permeability, and
hydraulic conductivity. 100 However, the epistemological difficulty with
relying on sampling in order to understand the hydrogeology of a site is
that one never knows when the number of samples collected is enough,
because one never knows if they are representative, or if the samples
have captured the heterogeneities of the site. One often cannot
adequately describe a site on the basis of several dozen boreholes; to
attempt to do so would be like characterizing a large library on the basis
of examining several dozen books. 10 1 It is well known, for example,
that the host tuffs at Yucca Mountain are "highly variable." 102 Different
23 in DOE, DE89005394).
98 R. EINZIGER & H. BUCHANAN, LONG-TERM, LOW-TEMPERATURE OXIDATION OF
PWR SPENT FUEL: INTERIM TRANSITION REPORT (1988) (Item 26 in DOE,
DE89005394).
99 S. Tyler, Deep Installations of Monitoring in Unsaturated Welded Tuff, in
INTERNATiONAL CONGRESS ON HYDROLOGY OF ROCKS OF Low PERlIvEABIrY (1985)
(Item 173 in DOE, DE89005394); see L. Candy & N. Mao, Nuclear Waste
Repository Characterization: A Spatial EstimationlIdentification Approach, in
EIGiTH TRIENNIAL WORLD CONGRESS-INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AUTOMATIC
CONTROL (1981) (Item 105 in DOE, DE89005394).
10 0 See, respectively, Y. CHUANG ET AL., LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF FLUID Fow
AND SOLUTE TRANSPORT THROUGH A VARIABLY SATURATED FRACTURE EMBEDDED iN
POROUS TUFF (1990) (Item 120 in DOE, DE91000566); W. Lin & W. Daily,
Laboratory Study of Fracture Healing in Topopah Spring Tuff, in NUCLEAR WASTE
ISOLATONiNTHE UNSATURATED ZONE (1989) (Item 47 in DOE, DE91000566); J.
CONNOLLY & F. NIMICK, MINERALOGIC AND CHEMICAL DATA SUPPORTING HEAT
CAPACiTY DETERMNATION FOR TUFFACEOUS RocKS (1990) (Item 66 in DOE,
DE91000566).
101 L. CARTER, NUCLEARiPERATIVES AND PUBuC TRUST 37 (1987).
102 D. Broxton, Clinoptilolite Compositions in Diagenetically Altered Tuffs at a
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tuff samples react differently to the same environmental constraints.
Often the samples are not representative of these differences, or it is not
known whether they are representative, and hence whether geostatistical
techniques give accurate estimates of variance. As late as 1988, for
instance, assessors mentioned that they had just completed "the only
hole drilled to date that penetrates the base of the tuff sequence and
enters the underlying Paleozoic dolomite basement."10 3
Different samples used in adsorption studies appear to present a
particular problem at Yucca Mountain. For example, when researchers
used various samples of groundwater and tuff in order to study potential
transport of radionuclides from a repository, they found that the
adsorptive properties of the radionuclides on tuff were a function of
time, temperature, and particle size, among other characteristics. 104
They also found that sorption values for various types of tuff differ,
e.g., by at least four orders of magnitude. 105 Hence, representative
adsorption samples are difficult to obtain, and conclusions about
adsorption are dependent both on problematic samples and their
representativeness, as well as on the models constructed from them. 106
Moreover, assessors are not able to check the representativeness of the
samples used in adsorption studies, because much of the data and theory
Potential Nuclear Waste Repository, Yucca Mountain, Nevada, in INTERFACE
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING (P. Hofmann, ed. 1987) (Item 90 in DOE, DE90006793;
see W. LINDERFELT, CHARACTERIZATION OF INFILIRATION INTO FRACTURED, WELDED
TUFF USING SMALL BOREHOLE DATA COLLECION TECHNIQUE (1986).
103 D. BISH & S. CHIPERA, REVISED MINERALOGIC SUMMARY OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN,
NEVADA, item 64 (1988) (Item 64 in DOE, DE90006793).
104 S. Knight & K. Thomas, Sorption of Radionuclides in Tuff Using
Groundwaters of Various Compositions, in 194TH NATIONAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN CHEMICAL SOCIETY (1987) (Item 4 in DOE, DE89005394); K. THOMAS,
SUMMARY OF SORPTION MEASUREMENTS PERFORMED WITH YUCCA MOUNTAIN,
NEVADA, TUFF SAMPLES AND WATER FROM WELL J-13 (1987) (Item 6 in DOE,
DE89005394); R. BECKMAN ET AL., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE STATISTICAL
EVALUATION oFSORPTION DATA (1988) (Item 7 in DOE, DE89005394).
105U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING ONTHE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEARWASTE (WASTE CONFIDENCE
RULEMAKING) 44 F. R. 61372 (1980).
1 0 6 H. FUENTES ET AL, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON SORPTION MODELING (1987).
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underlying sorptive barriers are incomplete, unknown, or
undeveloped. 107 In part because expert judgments about adsorption
appear to have contributed to an underestimation of radionuclide
transport at low-level radwaste sites like Maxey Flats and to a false
belief that plutonium would not migrate rapidly, 10 8 there is reason to be
cautious about any conclusions based on adsorption sampling.
Sampling methods used in repository risk assessments also often
fail to be representative because researchers have sometimes modified
the conditions under which they run experiments on samples. For
example, in some Yucca Mountain cases, hydrogeologists used
crushed-rock samples (not merely columns) to determine adsorptive
values. 109 Yet, adsorption of radionuclides at Yucca Mountain, once
1 0 7 M. MORGENSTEIN, PHYSICS AND CHEMIsTRY OF THE TRANSITION OF GLASS TO
AurHIGENIC MINERALS: STATE OF NEVADA, AGENCY OF NUCLEAR PROJECTS/NUCLEAR
WASTE PROJECT OFFICE (1984) (Item 291 in DOE, DE90006793); BECHMAN ET AL.,
supra note 104; D. BISH & S. CHIPERA, REVISED MNERALOGIC SUMMARY OF YUCCA
MUNTAIN, NEVADA (1989) (Item 64 in DOE, DE90006793); see also, D. FINNEGAN
& E. BRYANT, METHODS FOR OBTAINING SORPTION DATA FROM URANIUM-SERIES
DiSEQuIUmRiA (1987) (Item 55 in DOE, DE890006793); K. CAMPBELL, STATISTICAL
GUIDEtaNES FOR PLANNING A LIMITED DRIL[iNG PROGRAM (1988) (Item 60 in DOE,
DE90006793).
108 See K. Shrader-Frechette, Scientific Progress and Models of Justification: A
Case in Hydrogeology, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL PROGRESS (vol 2
RESEARCH IN TECHNOLOGY STUDIES, S. Goldman, ed. 1989) (Item 50 in DOE,
DE890006793).
109 Seq, e.g., A. Meijer et al., Sorption of Radionuclides on Yucca Mountain
Tuffs, ih NUCLEAR WASTE ISOATIONIN THE UNSATURATED ZONE: FOCUS '89 (1989)
(Item 82 in DOE, DE90006793); J. THOMPSON, LABORATORY AND FiELD STUDIES
RELATED TO THE RADIONUCLIDE MIfGRATIONPROJECT: PROGRESS REPORT, OCTOBER 1,
1986-SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 (1988) (Item 358 in DOE, DE90006793); J. Thompson,
Actinide Behavior on Crushed Rock Columns, 130 J. RADIOANAL & NUC. CHEM.
353 (1989); W. DANIELS, LABORATORY AND FIELD STUDIES RELATED TO THE
RADIONUCLiDE MIGRATIONPROJECrPROGRESS REPORT, OCTOBER 1, 1980-SETEmBER
30, 1981 (1982) (Item 125 in DOE, DE89005394); C. Duffy & S. Al-Hassan,
Time and Frequency Domain Analysis of Tracer Migration in Crushed Tuff, in
WORKSHOP ON MODELING OF SOLUTE TRANSPORT IN THE UNSATURATED ZONE (1987)
(Item 211 in DOE, DE89005394); R. Rundberg et al., Observation of Time
Dependent Dispersion in Laboratory Scale Experiments with Intact Tuff, in SECOND
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHEMISTRY AND MIGRATION BEHAVIOR OF ACrINIDES
AND FISSION PRODUCTS INTHE GEOSPHERE (1989) (Item 19 in DOE, DE91000566).
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containment has been breached, obviously will not occur in crushed
rock but in fractured, intact rock. Moreover, the fractured, intact rock is
less likely to adsorb radioactive materials (and retard migration) than is
crushed rock.1 10 Hence, use of crushed-rock samples probably
contributes to an underestimation of the risk of migration.
Despite general methodological problems with sampling and
particular difficulties with the representativeness of the Yucca Mountain
samples, many DOE researchers remain confident that the adsorption
values and radionuclide transport values "are being confirmed." 11 1
Obviously, however, by using different samples or different
groundwaters or more extensive sampling or less crushed tuff, one
could draw quite different conclusions about the adsorptive properties of
the radionuclides or the transmissivity of the tuff; hence, one could draw
different conclusions about the likelihood of radwaste migration offsite.
Simply by considering the possibility that plutonium can form pseudo-
colloids - that can facilitate transport - could reverse assessment
conclusions about radwaste migration. It is conceivable, therefore, that
for different samples under different conditions, for example, plutonium
might not be adsorbed or captured as assessors predict. 112 And if
sampling fails to provide accurate predictions, then expert judgments
(about the types and numbers of sampling that ought to be done) may
not provide a firm scientific basis for drawing general conclusions about
site suitability.
When researchers sampled infiltration of precipitation at two Yucca
Mountain sites, they found, e.g., hydrological activity at one location
but not at the other.113 Such results suggest that expert judgments about
110 See, Nuclear Waste Program: Hearings on the Current Status of the
Department of Energy's Civilian Nuclear Waste Activities Before the Sen. Comm.
on Energy & Natural Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1987).
111 A. Kelmers et al., Evaluation of DOE Radionuclide Solubility Data and
Selected Retardation Parameters: Description of Calculational and Confirmatory
Experimental Activities, in NRC RESEARCH ANNUAL REVIEW MEETNG OF NUCLEAR
WASrE MANAGEMENT RESEARCH ON GEOCHEMIS'Y OF ILW DISPosAL (1983) (Item
139 in DOE, DE89005394).
1 1 2 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Project History, in YUCCA MOUNTAIN PROJECr
BIBLOGRAPHY, 1988-1989 (1990).
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interpolating or extrapolating regarding missing sample points could
lead to difficulties, even if one employed geostatistics. Indeed, external
reviewers have warned that many technical assumptions - expert
judgments - about the site are not supported by field conditions and
may be inappropriate to the Yucca Mountain system. 114 Of course, one
obviously must make some types of expert judgments in hydrogeo-
logical situations, both about the quantity and representativeness of
sample data. The problem is not the expert judgments about sampling as
such, because they occur in all science and QRA. The real problem, in
the repository case, is the frequent absence of any ideas about the limits
of errors associated with such judgments. If one is ignorant about the
limits of error, then the idealizations, extrapolations, interpolations, and
simplifications could lead to false predictions, just as they did at Maxey
Flats and at other nuclear-waste facilities. Moreover, in the case of the
long time horizons associated with permanent repositories, it is
impossible to know the limits of error, to any precise degree, because of
the short-term data, the absence of long-term model confirmation, and
the inductive inferences associated with both.
In risk assessments of Maxey Flats, sampling problems similar to
those at Yucca Mountain caused serious difficulties and apparently
contributed to the lack of knowledge about the facility's potential for
radwaste migration. When industry geologists drilled wells at Maxey
Flats, they found that they were dry, perhaps because their samples did
not occur in areas where fractures happened to exist. When USGS
geologists did other sampling, using well tests, however, they noted
that some of the wells filled rather rapidly.115 Because of difficulties
associated with sampling, its representativeness, and its quantity,
different scientists at Maxey Flats obtained contradictory empirical
113 A. Norris et al., Infiltration at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Traced by 36Cl, 29
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS AND METHODS IN PHYSICS RESEARCH, SECIION B: BEAM
INTERAcroNs wrrm MATERIALS AND ATOMs (NmHmRAND S) 376 (1987) (Item 92 in
DOE, DE90006793).
114 GEOTRANS, supra note 62, at 1.
115 H. ZEHNER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HYDROLOGIC INVESTGATION OF THE
MAXEY FLATS RADIOACnVE WASIE BURIAL SITE, FLEMING COUNTY, KENTUCKY 110
(1981) (Open File Report).
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results. For this reason, there are grounds for questioning repository
risk data that are based on inadequate sampling. There are also grounds
for questioning the expert judgment that Yucca Mountain sampling has
already provided a reliable source of information about the site.
Admittedly, virtually all areas of science employ expert judgments
about sampling. Much science would be impossible without sampling.
Our point here is not that sampling is bad. The point, rather, is that in
certain situations - characterized by heterogeneous phenomena and
inadequate data to support very long-term predictions - the most
reliable sampling is done in an extremely conservative, i.e., thorough,
way. Because some Yucca Mountain sampling involved questionable
judgments, for example, about factors such as using crushed rock, the
sampling does not appear to have been done, in all cases, in a
conservative way. Hence there are grounds, in cases like Yucca
Mountain, for questioning some of the optimistic judgments of site
suitability, given that they are based on limited sampling. There are also
grounds for questioning the use of sampling as a basis for accurately
assessing repository risk because the greater the number of boreholes
drilled, for example, the more precisely we can characterize a proposed
site. But such precision is bought at a price, since less drilling means
less tendency to compromise site integrity, and more drilling (more
accuracy) means a greater likelihood of compromising site integrity. 116
Hence, conclusions about site suitability need to reflect accurately the
limits imposed by sampling.
Problems with Yucca Mountain versus
Problems with Permanent Disposal
Several of the expert judgments (e.g., about the reliability of
conclusions based on sampling) surveyed in this essay are widely used
throughout science and risk assessment. Hence, the difficulty is not
with using these judgments, as such, but with drawing stronger
conclusions from them than are warranted by the existing scientific
theories and inductive data. At Yucca Mountain, for example, we argued
that some of the DOE site-suitability conclusions appeared to be stronger
116 CARTER, supra note 101, at 38.
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than were warranted by the limited quantity and the questionable
representativeness of the evidence. In general, however, there are no
basic problems with employing expert judgments (such as those related
to model reliability, simplification, and sampling) in science and risk
assessment. Indeed, in many areas of science, there simply are no viable
alternatives to making a variety of such judgments.
However, a number of the expert judgments used in the Yucca
Mountain case do present difficulties. They appear to exemplify "bad
science." They suggest that, were certain judgments - regarding risk
estimation, for example - handled differently at Yucca Mountain, the
scientific conclusions about the site might be somewhat different. Some
of these examples of "bad science" include the expert judgments that
models not validated and confirmed by field data are accurate, and that
simplifying assumptions adequately represent the site, even though they
have not been checked by actual observations.
Obviously, if "bad science" was responsible for all of the flawed
expert judgments about risk estimation that we have criticized at Yucca
Mountain, then these problems would argue only against repository
sites chosen on the basis of flawed studies. "Bad science" would not
argue generally against permanent, geological disposal of radwaste. But
this raises the question whether the problems we have exposed in this
essay represent difficulties that might be avoidable at other proposed
repository sites or in other risk studies. Do these problems with expert
judgments about risk estimation argue only against "bad science" and
"bad risk assessment" or also against any permanent radwaste
repositories?
At least one of the expert judgments criticized in this essay appears
to present obstacles to any permanent, geological disposal of radwastes
anywhere. This is the judgment that short-term data can be used to
confirm precise conclusions about long-term (ca 10,000 years) site
acceptability. If the arguments in this essay have been correct, then
short-term scientific data militate against any precise, optimistic
predictions regarding long-term (10,000 years) repository suitability and
safety. Indeed, as we showed early in the essay, and as the Yucca
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Mountain peer reviewers for DOE confirmed, there can be no reliable
geological predictions regarding volcanism and seismicity, because
geology is essentially an explanatory, rather than a precise, predictive
science. As we also argued, and as the Yucca Mountain peer reviewers
and various social scientists admitted, beyond 50 or 100 years, precise
predictions about human and institutional errors and behavior are not
reliable. This being so, use of only short-term geological data
exacerbates the more general problem of accurate, long-term prediction.
U.S. regulations stipulate that precise, thousand-year predictions -
regarding either geological factors like seismicity or social factors like
repository intrusions aimed at securing natural resources - are required
to guarantee the safety of a permanent repository. 117 If such accurate,
long-term predictions are at present impossible, then a scientifically
defensible siting of a permanent repository, at least at present in the
U.S., likewise appears impossible.
117 See K.S. SHRADER-FECHETE, supra note 18. See also A. Berusch & E.
Gause, supra note 72.
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